Conflict stabilization measures in the Nigeria’s North East: A Bottom- Top Approach and Lessons Learnt for Effective local-level Involvement

Abstract

Fighting insecurity in a country like Nigeria poses a significant challenge due to inadequate modern infrastructure and low levels of awareness in many areas. These shortcomings, coupled with the silence in some communities, greatly hinder efforts to confront bandits, kidnappers and armed actors in the polity directly and effectively implement non-kinetic approaches. Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency and the government’s military response have killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced millions across the Lake Chad region, which links Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Although major military campaigns in 2015–2016 succeeded in degrading the group’s territorial control, Boko Haram has proven remarkably adaptable in its tactics: the end of 2018 once again saw an uptick in attacks in Nigeria’s BAY States. As Bola Tinubu assumes his first term as president, the conflict in the northeast appears far from resolved. Though the administration has made gains, but more still need to be done. Since the early years of the crisis, Nigeria’s international partners have cautioned that Boko Haram is unlikely to be defeated on the battlefield alone. They have stressed the need for a multidimensional response that tackles the drivers of insecurity in the region, including chronic weaknesses in service delivery, corrupt governance, and environmental degradation. However, the perception of limited leverage over Nigerian counterparts, restricted access to the country’s northeast, and a response to the crisis shaped by the U.S.-led Global War on Terror limited donors’ focus on these governance dimensions on the ground. This is the thrust of this paper. Using documentary methods and the technique of content analysis this paper provides an overview of these local-level efforts and the theories of change that underpinned them. It highlights initial lessons learned by donors and implementers of the programs. The study observed that the stabilization programs were designed with the assumption that the security situation in northeastern Nigeria would continue to improve, thereby facilitating the gradual return of displaced populations and local government. Yet in practice, Nigeria’s overstretched, under-resourced, and corruption-plagued military has struggled to consolidate its gains. Civilians in many parts of the northeast face ongoing threats from both insurgent attacks as well as counterterrorism operations. The paper recommends among other that strengthening local security mechanisms and restoring civilian administration and basic services are critical, the paper concludes.